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The late 1990s witnessed a large mergers and acquisitions wave. Many transactions involved equity
as the mode of payment (Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001)),
and this equity was usually very richly valued by historical standards. The positive correlation
between market valuation and merger activity has also been documented in other periods (Martin
(1996), Verter (2002)) and is especially strong for stock deals (Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)).
One interpretation of this evidence is that managers try to time the market by paying with stock
when they believe it is overvalued.
Recently, a number of papers formally recognized this link between possible mispricing and
acquisition activity. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose that overvalued rms engage in stock-
nanced acquisitions in order to obtain hard assets at an e¤ective discount. This discount comes
at the expense of the targets long-term shareholders, so their theory relies on di¤erent stock price
performance horizons for the managers of the two involved rms.1 Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004) develop another model in which misvaluation drives mergers. In their case, it is the inability
of target managers to distinguish between marketwide and rm-specic valuation errors that leads
them to rationally accept o¤ers from overvalued acquirers. Jensen (2004) also argues that overvalu-
ation inuences rmsacquisition decisions, as managers of the a¤ected rms attempt to prolong (or
exacerbate) the mispricing. To do so, they have to maintain the markets perception of the rms
prospects, and in the process they engage in value-destroying activities, such as earnings manage-
ment, unwarranted acquisitions, unprotable investments, and even outright fraud. In contrast to
the market-timing models of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004),
managers in this "market-fooling" model do not necessarily act in the interest of their long-term
shareholders (and very possibly against it).
One of the primary empirical predictions of the market-timing theory of acquisitions is that
the acquirers long-term shareholders benet from the bid, even though it might entail no real
synergies. The only requirement is that the chosen target be less overvalued than the acquirer.
A famous example of such a deal is America Onlines (AOL) stock-nanced acquisition of Time
Warner, which was one of the dening moments of the Internet bubble. Despite the high premium
paid by AOL (48% using the announcement day closing price) and the drop in its stock price
upon announcement (17.5% measured over a three-day window), the deal is now almost universally
regarded as benecial to AOLs long-term shareholders, not for the synergies it delivered, but simply
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because AOLs equity was overpriced at the time.
Of course, one example does not constitute real support for a theory. And, at rst glance,
the existing body of evidence does not support the hypothesis that stock acquisitions are in the
interest of long-term shareholders. Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) adopt
the event-time portfolio approach and nd that stock acquirers earn negative long-term abnormal
returns.2 Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) obtain the same nding with the calendar-time portfolio
approach. We document similar results for acquisitions announced in the 1978 to 2003 period.
Moreover, these negative long-term abnormal returns accrue on top of negative announcement
returns (Travlos (1987), Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller
(2002)). Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) report that between 1998 and 2001 the acquirers
shareholders lost 12 cents per every dollar spent on acquisitions. They trace this aggregate loss
to a small number of so-called "large loss" deals, executed by rms with very high valuations.
These rms not only have very negative announcement returns, but continue performing poorly
afterwards. Stock acquirers thus appear to su¤er negative performance both upon announcement
and over longer horizons.
The main problem complicating any analysis is the endogeneity of the acquisition decision: it is
exactly those rms that are most overvalued that have the greatest incentive to make an acquisition
before the market discovers the mispricing. Once we take this into account, we would expect
acquirers using stock nancing to have negative abnormal returns, even if the deals ultimately
beneted long-term shareholders. Simply put, the rst-order prediction for an overvalued rm is
that its stock price will eventually decline. Rather than disproving the market-timing theory, the
underperformance of stock acquirers actually ts well with its predictions.
However, the existing evidence still does not resolve the issue of whether valuation-driven acqui-
sitions benet or hurt long-term shareholders. The principal question is how stock acquirers would
have performed in the absence of the merger. In this paper we attempt to answer that question. In
order to get around the endogeneity problem, we utilize a simple natural experiment. Not all at-
tempted acquisitions are ultimately consummated. If, indeed, rms engage in acquisitions as a way
of issuing overvalued equity, we would expect those that fail to underperform those that complete
their deals. The unsuccessful acquirers represent a proxy for how the successful ones would have
performed had they not managed to close their transactions.
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Although this approach appears quite straightforward, the execution requires a great deal of
care. The biggest complication is the possibility that the cause of bid termination was somehow
related to the acquirers valuation. If the overvaluation of an acquirer is positively correlated to
the probability of failure, the average performance of failed acquirers should be worse than that of
successful ones, even if market-timing had nothing to do with why the deal was proposed. This is
not just a theoretical concern. For instance, sometimes deals are not consummated because of a
decline in the acquirers stock price or because the target ultimately decides not to accept the o¤er,
both of which might be more likely outcomes for overvalued bidders. To alleviate this problem,
we research every failed transaction in our sample and create a subsample of those that did not
succeed for exogenous reasons. (In this context, exogenous means unrelated to the valuation of
the acquirer.) The subsample includes bids that failed because of regulatory disapproval (mostly
antitrust action), subsequent competing o¤ers, or unexpected target developments. We also restrict
this subsample to non-hostile bids, since hostile bids are more likely to fail and targets might be
more inclined to resist o¤ers by overvalued rms.
The results are quite striking. Failed stock-nanced acquirers underperform successful ones in
a statistically signicant and economically meaningful way. Over a one-year horizon starting at bid
announcement, buy-and-hold abnormal returns earned by the two groups diverge by 13.6%, and
that number grows to 22.2% for a two-year horizon and 31.2% for a three-year horizon. When we
adopt the calendar-time portfolio approach, acquirers that close deals outperform those that do
not (measured as the abnormal return of the corresponding long-short portfolio) by 20.9%, 19.5%,
and 25.2% over one-, two-, and three-year horizons, respectively. Unsuccessful acquirers continue
su¤ering low abnormal returns even after bid termination is announced, which eases concerns that
any di¤erence between failed and successful acquirers reects the developments that caused the
deal to break down rather than the fact that the former do not consummate their deals. Indeed,
while long-term performance is negative, the market greets bid termination with a positive reaction.
Whatever events bring about deal failure, the market does not seem to interpret them as a negative
signal about the acquirers prospects.
If market-timing concerns really inuence rmsM&A activity, we should expect any results to be
more pronounced for richly valued bidders, which is exactly what we nd in the data. Both successful
and failed glamor stock acquirers substantially underperform value stock acquirers. Furthermore,
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the disparity in performance between bidders that close their deals and those that do not is higher
for glamor bidders, indicating that failure is more costly when a rms stock price is high. This
is exactly what we would predict if issuing overvalued equity is a motivating factor behind merger
decisions.
The di¤erence in abnormal returns between unsuccessful and successful acquirers could provide
us with a rough estimate of the value transferred from the targets long-term shareholders to those
of the acquirer. But this measure would include any synergies captured by successful acquirers,
which could potentially bias it (as an estimate of market-timing gains). An alternative measure of
benets to long-term shareholders looks at how the failed acquirer would have done had the deal
succeeded. In our sample, a hypothetical combination of the acquirer and a proxy for its target
would have earned higher abnormal returns than the acquirer did by itself, with the di¤erence
going up to 11.8% for a three-year horizon. Importantly, this return di¤erential does not reect
any synergies the deal might have yielded, thus focusing the analysis on market-timing benets the
acquirer forgoes by not closing the deal.
The market-timing theory posits di¤erent motivations for cash- and stock-nanced acquirers.
While cash acquirers create value for their shareholders only through synergies they extract from the
combination with the target, stock acquirers benet from both synergies and any di¤erence between
the market and fundamental value of their equity. Therefore, if the theory is correct, we would expect
the di¤erence in performance between successful and failed acquirers to be less pronounced for cash
bids. This conjecture is conrmed in the data. Failed cash-nanced acquirers do not underperform
successful ones and enjoy positive abnormal returns subsequent to bid termination. (The latter
result is generally not statistically signicant, probably due to small sample size.)
The divergence between the performance of unsuccessful cash-nanced and stock-nanced ac-
quirers is important for another reason: it enables us to distinguish between market-timing and
neoclassical theories of mergers. The latter views merger activity as an e¢ ciency-motivated re-
sponse to technological, regulatory, or economic shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Maksimovic
and Phillips (2001), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Harford (2005)). When a deal fails, the as-
sociated e¢ ciency improvements are not realized, leading to worse operating performance of the
involved rms. Bid failure might also indicate that the acquirers management is incompetent or
that the rm operates in a deteriorating regulatory or competitive environment. This gives us
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an alternative explanation for why failed acquirers have lower returns than successful ones. The
neoclassical perspective, though, counterfactually predicts the same e¤ect for both cash and stock
transactions (under the assumption that synergies are similar). Crucially, it also forecasts negative
returns upon the announcement of deal failure, while the opposite is observed for stock acquirers.
Overall, our evidence suggests that stock acquisitions serve the interests of bidderslong-term
shareholders. The comparison between successful and failed acquirers indicates that, despite the
negative announcement and post-event returns for stock acquirers, their long-term shareholders are
still better o¤ than they would have been without these deals. In contrast, failure to consummate is
not costly for shareholders of cash bidders. These ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that
overvalued rms engage in M&A activity as a means of issuing overpriced stock.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines how our data set is con-
structed, describes our methodology, and denes all the variables. Section II presents our ndings.
Section III relates them to the existing literature, and Section IV concludes.
I. Data and Methodology
A. Sample Construction
The core of the sample used in this paper comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Merger Database and SDC Platinum, which we combine to create a comprehensive data
set of M&A activity. CRSP Merger Database contains details on 12,578 merger bids for public
companies made between January 1962 and December 2000. In addition to the identities of the
involved parties, the data set provides information on whether the deal succeeded, whether it was
friendly, hostile, or neutral, the mode of payment, and the relevant dates in the history of the
transaction (announcement, preliminary agreement, revision, rejection, failure, and completion).3
SDC Platinum is a widely used data set covering equity issuance, M&A, and syndicated loan activity.
Its M&A coverage starts in 1978 and is updated constantly.
We obtain data on stock returns, rm size, and share type from CRSP. Annual accounting
data are obtained from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database. Factor returns and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) size breakpoints come from Kenneth Frenchs website. We add this
information to our merger data set. To be included in the nal sample, a bid has to satisfy the
following criteria:
5
i. The announcement date falls between 1978 and 2003. We choose the 2003 cuto¤ in order to
provide at least three years of data for each rm after the initial announcement.
ii. The acquirer is a U.S. public rm.
iii. Relevant data on the acquirer are available from CRSP and CRSP/COMPUSTAT.
iv. The acquirers market capitalization exceeds that of rms in the bottom decile using NYSE
size breakpoints.
v. Pre-announcement market value of the targets equity is at least 5% of the acquirers market
value. The employment of such a screen is standard in the literature. It ensures that the
proposed deal has a material impact on the acquirers future. The inclusion of bids for very
small rms would just add noise. In any case, none of the ndings change with alternative
thresholds, regardless of whether they are more or less restrictive.
vi. The mode of payment is all-cash or all-equity. We exclude more complicated transactions,
because the market-timing hypothesis does not produce clear predictions for such cases.
vii. The acquirer has not engaged in another bid in the previous three years using the same merger
consideration. This ensures no rm appears more than once in our portfolios at any point in
time.
viii. The bid represents the rst o¤er by a given acquirer for a given target in that bidding cycle.
Otherwise, we would be overweighing contested (by competitors or regulators) deals, which
account for a disproportionate number of failed bids, and in the process bias our t-statistics
upwards.
All our ndings are robust to di¤erent sample selection criteria: they do not change if we
include American Depository Receipts, if we include acquirers in the bottom NYSE size decile, or
if we include acquirers that have made a merger bid within the last three years.
The nal sample consists of 1,773 (1,050 stock and 723 cash) consummated and 355 (187 stock
and 168 cash) unconsummated deals. Figure 1 shows the time-series distribution of these merger
bids. One can easily observe the equity-nanced merger wave occurring in the second half of the
1990s.
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
B. Failed Merger Bids
The main goal of this paper is to determine whether stock-nanced bids create value for the ac-
quirers long-term shareholders. The most straightforward way to address this issue is to look at the
acquiring rms long-term abnormal returns. For example, one could assess acquirersperformance
by comparing their returns to those of non-acquiring rms with similar relevant characteristics.
However, if, as the market-timing theory argues, overvalued equity is one of the motivations behind
the deal, this approach would produce misleading results. When the stock price of a rm exceeds
its fundamental value, we expect it to eventually decline. An acquisition executed on favorable
terms for the bidder might ameliorate this eventual fall, but is unlikely to reverse it. Even the most
careful matching algorithm cannot resolve this endogeneity problem. In a scenario where two rms
with the same characteristics are considering buying the same target rm, the more overvalued one
will have a greater incentive to do so. Consequently, on average acquirers will be more overvalued
than their matched rms.
The market-timing theory predicts that stock acquirers should have negative abnormal returns,
but that those returns are higher than what would have been observed in the absence of the ac-
quisition. The crucial problem therefore is to estimate the performance of the acquirer in the
hypothetical scenario in which the deal had not taken place. One way to proceed would be to
compute the fundamental value of the rms equity (dened as the sum of the associated cash ows
discounted at the appropriate rate). The conventional approach in the literature relies on price-
to-value ratios and/or analyst forecasts for this calculation. Both of those inputs are potentially
problematic. Accounting ratios might signal a rms future growth rate or the riskiness of its cash
ows rather than any mispricing. The same biases that skew the markets expectations might a¤ect
analyst forecasts, or those forecasts might just be catering to the market.
To avoid these problems with estimating fundamental value, we opt for a di¤erent methodol-
ogy. The key to our research approach is the distinction between those acquirers that successfully
complete their deals and those that do not. If mergers are indeed benecial to the acquirers share-
holders, failed acquirers should on average underperform successful ones. By comparing post-event
returns of the two groups, we can infer whether stock bids are in the interest of the acquirers
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shareholders.
Unfortunately, not all unconsummated deals are eligible for inclusion in the analysis. One
essential assumption underlying our approach is that the cause of deal termination is unrelated to
the valuation of an acquirer. If the acquirers overvaluation is positively correlated to the probability
of failure, the average performance of failed bidders should be worse than that of successful ones,
even if market-timing had nothing to do with why the deal was proposed. This is by no means only
a theoretical possibility. For example, some bids fail because the acquirers stock price drops before
the transaction is consummated. It is probable that there is a greater chance of this happening with
more overvalued acquirers. It is also very plausible that targets tend to be less receptive to o¤ers
made by overvalued rms (i.e., the correlation between probability of rejection by the target and
acquirer overvaluation is positive).4 To address such concerns, before we proceed with the analysis
we have to screen out any deals that fail for endogenous reasons.5 (Here we dene "endogenous" as
"connected to the mispricing of the acquirer.") Otherwise, our results could be biased in favor of
accepting the hypothesis that failed acquirers underperform successful ones.
We investigate every unsuccessful deal using LexisNexis and Factiva and attempt to determine
why it did not close. This requires extensive research, since headlines sometimes obscure the real
causes of deal failure. A good case in point is Mattels bid for Hasbro in 1996, which was ostensibly
blocked by antitrust issues. However, after a more careful examination, it becomes apparent that
regulatory pressure was actually actively sought by Hasbro, as a way of stopping Mattel. We
consequently choose to categorize the deal as a rejection by the target.
We employ this information to exclude any deal whose failure was endogenously caused (ac-
cording to the above denition) from the sample containing all failed bids (All Failed Sample).
The Exogenous Failed Sample contains only those bids that did not close because of objections by
regulatory bodies, competing o¤ers, or unexpected target developments. Regulator action usually
takes the form of antitrust complaints (or threats thereof) by the Department of Justice, Federal
Trade Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, European
Union Commission, or local authorities. Other regulatory bodies that occasionally block mergers
include the Securities and Exchange Commission, which sometimes did not approve transactions
as a pooling of interests, the Food and Drug Administration, which in one instance started an
audit that blocked the proposed deal, the Federal Communications Commission, which lowered ca-
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ble television rates, and the Labor Department, which withheld approval for the Employee Stock
Ownership Plan required to consummate one transaction. Competing o¤ers are bids by rival rms
for the same target made subsequent to the original acquirers rst o¤er. The unexpected target
developments category mostly covers bids that fail because the target experiences problems sub-
sequent to the announcement. These problems are usually revealed through earnings releases or
pre-releases, restatements, rating agency downgrades, and/or due diligence.
There are two ways to view deals that are not consummated because of developments a¤ecting
the target rm. One perspective is that the prospective acquirer was merely unlucky in choosing
an appropriate target. Given a number of candidates, the acquirer opted for the wrong one, but
this choice was unrelated to the acquirers misvaluation. Under this interpretation, those bids
should also be considered in the analysis. The other perspective on these deals, however, might
caution against their inclusion in the analysis. Maybe the only reason the target accepted a bid
by an overvalued rm was because it foresaw the possibility of negative developments in its own
future. In that case, the cause of deal termination would be, if only indirectly, related to the
acquirers valuation, which might potentially bias our results. The Restricted Exogenous Failed
Sample excludes any transactions that did not close because of target-related matters. Due to
the small number of observations in the Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample, we usually focus
on the ndings obtained from the Exogenous Failed Sample. Table I presents in detail how we
construct this sample, which consists of 148 merger bids (72 stock and 76 cash). Table II shows
how consummated and unconsummated bids are distributed over time.
[TABLES I AND II ABOUT HERE]
One prominent example of a deal that failed because of exogenous reasons is WorldComs bid
for Sprint. (The deal is actually not included in our sample, as WorldCom engaged in multiple
stock bids prior to this event. We use it as an example here because most readers are likely to be
at least somewhat familiar with the two rms). WorldComs bid was announced in October 1999,
but could not overcome opposition from U.S. and European regulators and was ultimately called
o¤ in July 2000. The market welcomed the abandonment news, bidding up WorldComs stock by
10.7% over a three-day window around the announcement. Over the next two years, WorldCom
collapsed in an accounting scandal, where it turned out it improperly classied expenses in order
to meet earnings expectations. Its shareholders lost their entire investment. While it is hard to
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speculate what would have happened to WorldCom had the deal gone through, it is clear Sprints
shareholders should be satised with the outcome. And it is certainly possible that, strengthened
by the addition of Sprint, WorldCom could have survived. At the very least, the market seems to
have misinterpreted deal termination as a positive event for the rm. It is worth remembering that
AOL was also embroiled in a scandal regarding its accounting practices in 2000 and 2001, which
resulted in a multi-million dollar settlement and indictments against its executives. But, thanks to
the completion of its deal with Time Warner, the experience of its shareholders was far better than
that of WorldComs shareholders. Indeed, if inated earnings were what made AOLs bid possible,
one could argue they were benecial to its long-term shareholders.6
Our analysis relies on the performance of failed acquirers as a proxy for the initial overvaluation
of successful acquirers. There are two important assumptions underpinning this approach. First,
making a bid has no impact on an acquirers stand-alone fundamental value. Although involvement
in an o¤er carries costs, such as legal and advisory fees or management time and e¤ort, these
expenses are usually not substantial enough to have a material e¤ect (especially since many fees
are contingent on success). A more serious concern is that deal failure signals an adverse industry
shock. Maybe antitrust action means that the regulatory environment in which a rm operates has
become less favorable. Or a rival bid portends a more competitive industry. We attempt to control
for this possibility by measuring performance in industry-adjusted terms. We also use termination
returns to examine whether the market interprets failure as a negative development (the opposite
is true). Second, once a bidder fails, it cannot acquire another rm, at least not at the same terms
as before. Given the negative announcement returns for stock acquirers documented both in this
paper and in the literature, this appears to be a reasonable conjecture. The initial bid likely reveals
to the market, if only partially, that the potential acquirers stock is overvalued. Even if an acquirer
manages to nd a di¤erent target, a task complicated by the need to not reveal its mispricing to
the market (a sequence of bids might raise suspicions about the motivation behind them), its equity
would be less overvalued, so any market-timing benets it derives from the deal would be lower.
In the sample used here, failed acquirers rarely make o¤ers for a di¤erent target within three years
of the unsuccessful bid, suggesting the assumption is a well-grounded one. If we excluded from
our sample failed acquirers that subsequently succeed in buying any rm, we would lose only 21
observations (11 stock and 10 cash bids) and all our ndings would remain unaltered.
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C. Variable Denitions
Book equity is computed as in Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). We assume markets get
access to nancial statement information four months after the scal year ends.7 All accounting
values used always reect the latest data available to the public. Firm size is calculated as the
market value of its equity as of market close two trading days before the merger is announced, and
book-to-market is computed as the ratio of the companys book equity and its market capitalization
(as of the end of the previous month).
We measure the performance of rms by analyzing their long-term abnormal returns. The proper
methodology for calculating these returns has been much debated in the literature. Barber and
Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) propose the use of buy-and-hold abnormal returns,
arguing that these most accurately capture investor experience. Fama (1998) instead advocates a
calendar-time portfolio approach, on the grounds that the buy-and-hold methodology exacerbates
any bad model problems through compounding and ignores potential cross-sectional correlation of
event-rm abnormal returns. Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) show that the latter issue can signicantly
bias test statistics calculated using buy-and-hold abnormal returns, especially when holding periods
for di¤erent stocks overlap in calendar time. Loughran and Ritter (2000) worry that the calendar-
time portfolio approach is not well suited for detecting abnormal performance associated with events,
such as mergers, that are clustered across time. Given these strongly conicting opinions, we utilize
both the event-time and calendar-time methodologies.
Our buy-and-hold abnormal returns are adjusted for rm size, book-to-market ratio, and indus-
try. The rst two variables are well-known predictors of the cross-section of stock returns (Fama
and French (1992), Fama and French (1993)). It has been extensively documented that, within
a wave, mergers cluster by industry (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Mulherin and Boone (2000),
Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001)). Moreover, merger bids in certain industries have a higher
probability of failure (e.g., because those industries are subject to greater regulatory scrutiny or
because they contain a high number of potential rival bidders). To ensure our results are not simply
reecting a di¤erence in performance between various industries, which could plausibly stem from
industry-specic economic shocks, we conduct our analysis with controls for industry.
The approach we adopt is as follows. We rst identify all rms with the same two-digit SIC code
and market value of equity between 50% and 150% of the market value of equity of the sample rm.
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Those rms that were involved in a merger bid over the previous three years are excluded. We then
pick the rm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample rm. This entire process
is repeated 10 times to obtain 10 control rms. The matching portfolio is an equally weighted
portfolio of these 10 control rms. If there are less than 10 matching rms (because there are not
enough rms in the same industry that satisfy the size criterion), the matching portfolio contains
less than 10 control rms. If one of the control rms disappears from CRSP before the end of the
holding period, it is replaced by the next-best match. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)
for rm i is given by
BHARi m;n = BH
i
 m;n  BH ind_match_i m;n , (1)
where BH i m;n is the buy-and-hold return for rm i over a period startingm trading days before the
reference date (usually the announcement of the bid) and ending n trading days after the reference
date, and BH ind_match_i m;n is the corresponding return for rm is industry-, size-, and book-to-
market-matched portfolio. If rm i disappears from CRSP before the end of the holding period,
the abnormal returns for the rest of the period are set to zero.
This approach is a modied version of the matching rm approach advocated by Barber and
Lyon (1997). The main di¤erence is that we use a portfolio of 10 rms rather than a single rm.
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue for a single matching rm as a solution to what they term the
skewness bias, which arises because long-term abnormal returns are positively skewed. In relatively
small samples, such as some of the ones in this paper, the approach of matching to just one rm is
very sensitive to possible mismatches. For example, if just a few of the sample rms are matched
to rms that happened to experience very high returns, the mean return of the entire sample might
be negative, even if all other sample rms have nonnegative abnormal returns. To alleviate the
impact of such outliers, we opt for a portfolio approach. This means that the skewness bias could
potentially inuence our results, but, given the small size of the matching portfolio, we do not
believe this to be a serious problem. In any case, all our results remain the same with the single
matching rm approach.
[TABLE III ABOUT HERE]
The calendar-time portfolio approach we employ is the standard one used in the literature.
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Each month we form portfolios consisting of all rms that initiated an eligible bid within the last n
months (where n is the length of the holding period). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly, with
those rms that reach the end of the holding period dropping out and new acquirers coming in. If a
rm is delisted before the end of the holding period, we include its delisting return in computing the
portfolio return. We then calculate the portfolio i mean monthly abnormal return (i) by regressing
its excess return on the three Fama-French factors:
Rit  Rft = i + i(Rmart  Rft ) + iSMBt + iHMLt, (2)
where Ri is the equal-weighted portfolio i return, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rmar is the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio return, SMB is the return of a portfolio of small stocks minus the return
of a portfolio of large stocks (size factor), and HML is the return of a portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks minus the return of a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks (book-to-market factor).
One potential problem with applying the calendar-time methodology in this paper is the rela-
tively small number of failed acquirers, which means that portfolios containing these rms sometimes
consist of very few stocks (e.g., the median number of stocks in the Exogenous Failed Sample three-
year portfolio is ve). The concern that the calendar-time approach overweights events that occur
in periods with low activity and underweights events that occur in periods with high activity is well
known, but is especially acute when the number of observations is small. We attempt to address
this issue in two di¤erent ways. First, we create portfolios in which each stocks weight is limited to
25%. If there are fewer than four rms in the portfolio at any point in time, each stock will carry
only a 25% weight and the rest will be invested in the market portfolio. Second, instead of running
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, we use weighted least squares (WLS) regressions, where
the weights are given by the number of stocks in the portfolio. The advantage of the WLS approach
is that it gives more weight to those months in which there are more stocks in the analyzed port-
folios. This methodology also addresses potential heteroskedasticity issues that might arise due to
clustering of mergers across time. We always report results for all three calendar-time approaches:
OLS and equally weighted portfolios, OLS and restricted weight portfolios, and WLS and equally
weighted portfolios.
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II. Results
A. Summary Statistics
Tables IV and V present summary statistics for stock- and cash-nanced merger bids, respec-
tively. Acquirers have lower book-to-market ratios than targets, and this di¤erence appears much
more pronounced for stock deals.8 Stock bidders are also larger, engage in bigger transactions, and
enjoy higher returns in the year prior to the deal compared to cash bidders. The announcement
returns for stock acquirers are negative and statistically signicant. Unsurprisingly, targets enjoy
signicantly positive announcement returns. These returns are higher for targets of cash bids.9
[TABLES IV AND V ABOUT HERE]
All of these ndings are well documented in the literature and are consistent with the market-
timing theory of acquisitions. As Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predict, stock acquirers are more over-
valued than their targets, as reected in lower book-to-market ratios and higher pre-announcement
returns. They attempt to complete larger deals, since they have more motivation to do so than
cash bidders. They su¤er negative announcement returns because the attempted acquisition re-
veals, at least partly, their misvaluation to the market. More important for this paper are the
di¤erences across various samples. Our analysis depends on comparisons between successful and
failed acquirers. If there are systematic di¤erences between the two groups of bidders, our results
could reect those di¤erences rather than any benets of completing a merger. To assuage this
concern, our measure of a rms performance is based on returns adjusted for industry, size, and
book-to-market. Although we believe such an approach signicantly reduces any problems arising
from potential di¤erences between successful and failed bidders, we still nd it reassuring that the
two groups are relatively similar.
For stock bids, successful and failed acquirers have comparable announcement returns. We are
especially encouraged by this similarity, which tells us that as of the announcement the market did
not discriminate between successful and failed bids. Book-to-market ratios of successful acquirers
are lower than those of failed ones. If book-to-market is a proxy for valuation, it seems that
successful bidders are actually somewhat more highly priced than those that do not complete their
deals. This is important for our analysis, as it suggests that, holding everything else constant, we
should expect failed acquirers to enjoy higher returns than their successful counterparts. Thus, if
anything, the di¤erence in pre-announcement book-to-market ratios across our samples creates a
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bias against documenting underperformance of rms that do not consummate their transactions
relative to those that do.10
The two major di¤erences between successful and failed stock acquirers are that the latter are
larger and attempt to complete bigger deals. This is not surprising, since regulatory action is
substantially more probable for such bids. Antitrust authorities focus on mergers that will result
in signicant market power for the combined rm, and this usually means the bidder is a large rm
and is proposing to acquire another sizeable rm. Perhaps there is also a greater likelihood of a
competing o¤er in large deals, as the xed costs of making a bid are lower relative to deal size.
Moreover, the di¤erence in mean values is somewhat misleading, given the impact of a few very
large failed bidders. When median values are considered, the di¤erence in acquirer size completely
disappears (the relationship is then reversed). The same disparity in transaction size is present in
cash bids. For cash deals, the announcement returns for both failed acquirers and their targets
appear to be a bit lower than for rms involved in consummated bids. In other respects, successful
and failed cash bids look similar.
B. Post-Announcement Performance of Successful and Failed Acquirers
Table VI reports acquirer announcement and long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The
main focus is on the comparative performance of rms that complete their deals and those that
do not. Successful stock-nanced acquirers su¤er signicantly negative returns. Over the rst
250 trading days (roughly one year) beginning with (and including) the announcement, the mean
abnormal return for stock bidders in the Successful Sample is -7.0% (t-statistic=-5.01).11 It then
becomes steadily worse and falls to -13.1% (t-statistic=-3.88) for a three-year holding period. Such
performance certainly does not suggest these transactions were benecial to shareholders. However,
failed stock acquirers do much worse. The mean abnormal return for stock bidders in the Exogenous
Failed Sample declines from -20.6% (t-statistic=-3.60) for a one-year holding period to -31.9% (t-
statistic=-4.44) for a two-year holding period and -44.2% (t-statistic=-5.08) for a three-year holding
period. Despite their negative returns, successful stock acquirers outperform unsuccessful ones by
a considerable margin, which widens with the horizon and is statistically signicant at the 5% level
for a one-year horizon and at the 1% level for two- and three-year horizons.12 Importantly, this
performance di¤erential dwarfs the negative announcement returns, which means that the deals
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created value for long-term shareholders even after we take the initial market reaction into account.
[TABLE VI ABOUT HERE]
The ndings remain unaltered when we analyze the All Failed Sample, where unsuccessful stock
acquirers underperform successful ones by 13.2% (t-statistic=3.44), 16.6% (t-statistic=3.17), and
20.7% (t-statistic=3.18) over one-, two-, and three-year horizons, respectively. This sample likely
contains some deals whose failure was related to the acquirers valuation, which makes it a biased
proxy for acquirer performance without the merger. Nevertheless, the similarity between results
obtained from the All Failed Sample and those obtained from a more restricted sample is a positive
development, as it suggests that our main ndings are robust to the choice of criteria for inclusion
in the analysis. Furthermore, it might also indicate that the only di¤erence between failed acquirers
excluded from the Exogenous Failed Sample and those included is that the mispricing of the former
group is revealed sooner than that of the latter group. The results also continue to hold in the
Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample, where the performance di¤erential between successful and
failed bidders is statistically signicant at the 5% level for all horizons except the shortest one, with
point estimates that are about the same as in the previous two samples.
The relative underperformance of failed stock acquirers indicates that stock acquisitions benet
long-term shareholders. It thus supports the market-timing theory of acquisitions. But this result is
also consistent with the neoclassical explanation for merger activity. If a rms optimal response to
a shock is an acquisition, and this response is for some reason blocked, it is perhaps not surprising
that it lags its more successful rivals. A rm with poor growth opportunities might feel particularly
pressured to boost its future performance and consequently engage in acquisitions that have a lower
probability of success than those attempted by rms with better growth prospects. If nothing else,
bid failure might represent an adverse signal about the competency of the acquirers management
or the outlook for its industry.
These neoclassical theories do not distinguish between cash- and stock-nanced acquisitions,
so the same negative relation between failure and subsequent returns should be detected for cash
acquirers. In contrast, the market-timing theory makes no such prediction. That theory posits that,
in the case of failure, stock acquirers forgo the opportunity to convert overpriced stock into hard
assets, in addition to any gains they might have realized from synergies or target undervaluation.13
Therefore, termination should have a more adverse e¤ect on stock bidders than cash bidders (under
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the assumption that synergies are similar for both types of deals). Their di¤erent perspective on
the relation between mode of payment and consequences of failure provides us with an opportunity
to discriminate between the two hypotheses.
In contrast to stock-nanced acquirers, cash-nanced bidders that complete their bids do not
underperform (they actually outperform over shorter horizons). And, despite somewhat lower an-
nouncement returns, failed cash bidders do not su¤er worse abnormal returns than successful ones.
For cash acquirers in the Exogenous Failed Sample, the return di¤erential between successful and
failed acquirers is 5.7% (t-statistic=1.08), -2.6% (t-statistic=-0.34), and -7.6% (t-statistic=-0.66)
over one-, two-, and three-year holding periods, respectively. Similar results hold in the All Failed
Sample and the Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample, all showing that the performance of failed
cash bidders does not lag that of successful cash bidders. This di¤erence between cash- and stock-
nanced bids favors the market-timing theory and is not easily explained within the framework of
the neoclassical theory.
These event-time results are quite robust. They still hold if we use a single rm to calculate the
benchmark return instead of a 10-rm portfolio, if we omit industry controls from our matching
algorithm, or if we rely on simple market-adjusted returns as our measure of performance (results
available on request). This should lessen any concerns that our results stem from a particular
method of adjusting returns rather than a fundamental di¤erence in performance between the two
groups of bidders. These ndings are also not driven by the Internet bubble period (dened as years
1999 and 2000), as they remain the same if merger bids announced in those years are excluded from
analysis.
All of the above ndings also survive the switch to the calendar-time methodology. We focus our
discussion on results obtained using WLS regressions and equally weighted portfolios, but nothing
changes when we instead use OLS regressions and equally weighted or restricted weight portfolios.
Stock-nanced acquirers that consummate their deals have signicantly negative calendar-time ab-
normal returns. When we employ the Fama-French three-factor model in Table VII, the mean
annualized abnormal return for the successful stock acquirer portfolio is -6.3% (t-statistic=-3.26),
-7.0% (t-statistic=-3.80), and -6.0% (t-statistic=-3.45%) for one-, two-, and three-year holding pe-
riods, respectively.14 This suggests signicant underperformance for successful stock bidders, but,
as before, failed stock acquirers su¤er substantially lower abnormal returns. Over one-, two-, and
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three-year horizons, the portfolio containing rms in the Exogenous Failed Sample has a mean
annualized abnormal return of -25.8% (t-statistic=-4.18), -16.6% (t-statistic=-3.45), and -14.2%
(t-statistic=-3.44), respectively. The di¤erence in performance between successful and failed ac-
quirers (measured as the abnormal return of the corresponding long-short portfolio) is economically
and statistically signicant for all three horizons. These results do not change when we utilize the
market model to adjust returns instead of the Fama-French three-factor model (results available on
request), suggesting again that our ndings are not driven purely by our choice of a particular asset
pricing model.
The performance di¤erential remains about the same when we study the All Failed Sample.
Its statistical signicance is even higher, which is not surprising given that this sample contains
more than double the number of observations relative to the Exogenous Failed Sample. The small
number of observations likely explains why the di¤erence in performance between successful and
failed bidders is only marginally signicant for the Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample. Point
estimates are very similar, but there are just not enough rms in the portfolio to always ensure
statistical signicance.
[TABLE VII ABOUT HERE]
Table VIII shows that the mean abnormal return for the successful cash acquirer portfolio is never
statistically signicant. Moreover, its sign switches with di¤erent horizons. Failed cash acquirers
exhibit no underperformance compared to successful ones, regardless of the sample, horizon, or
methodology. As with our analysis of buy-and-hold returns, the impact of failure to close the deal
is di¤erent depending on the mode of payment, which is exactly what the market-timing theory
predicts.
[TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE]
C. Post-termination Performance of Failed Acquirers
The disparity in performance between successful and failed stock bidders increases with the
length of the holding period. This is a very important result, because it eases concerns that any
di¤erence between successful and failed acquirers reects the developments that caused the deal to
break down rather than the fact that the latter do not consummate their deals. In the former case,
we would expect all of the underperformance to be concentrated in the months close to merger
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announcement. Given that failed bidders exhibit poor returns for a prolonged period of time, it is
less plausible to attribute those returns exclusively to the events that stopped these deals.
To address this same issue further, in Table IX we examine how unsuccessful acquirers fare
after the announcement of bid termination. They su¤er signicantly negative long-term abnormal
returns. Over a one-, two-, and three-year holding period starting after the termination announce-
ment date, the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return for stock acquirers in the Exogenous Failed
Sample equals -21.1% (t-statistic=-4.29), -28.8% (t-statistic=-4.15), and -37.2% (t-statistic=-4.96),
respectively. The post-termination returns remain negative and signicant in the Restricted Ex-
ogenous Failed Sample and the All Failed Sample. Even after the news concerning the failed stock
bidders intent to complete an acquisition (typically associated with a negative market reaction)
and their failure to do so successfully comes out, it appears that these rms remain substantially
overvalued. At the very least, the relative underperformance of failed stock acquirers does not stem
solely from events associated with the merger, which validates one of the basic premises underly-
ing our analysis. In contrast, unsuccessful cash bidders earn positive abnormal returns, although
these are never statistically signicant. Again, as the market-timing theory suggests, there is a
fundamental di¤erence between stock and cash acquirers.
[TABLE IX ABOUT HERE]
The announcement returns around bid termination are signicantly positive for stock bidders.
This bullish market reaction to bid termination does not support the hypothesis that acquisitions
are optimal responses to economic shocks or that bid failure reveals negative information about the
acquirer (such as incompetency of its management or poor growth opportunities), in which cases
we would expect to see negative termination returns. This is of crucial importance for our analysis,
which implicitly depends on the assumption that failure does not adversely a¤ect the fundamental
value of the acquiring rms existing assets. If failure signaled some negative information about
the intrinsic value of the acquirer, then our nding that unsuccessful stock bidders underperform
successful ones does not necessarily imply that stock bids benet shareholders.
One interpretation for the positive termination returns is that investors welcome the abandon-
ment of the deal, despite the fact it actually serves their long-term interests. This is plausible: the
same shareholders who are willing to hold overpriced stock might mistakenly oppose the bid, given
their unrealistic expectations about the acquirers stand-alone prospects. Another interpretation
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is that merger arbitrageurs cover their short positions in the acquirers stock and in the process
push up its price (the usual trade in stock-nanced mergers is to buy the target stock and sell
short an appropriate amount of the acquirer stock, so that the investors net exposure is hedged).
This price pressure exerted by arbitrageurs can be considerable. Mitchell, Pulvino, and Sta¤ord
(2004) estimate that merger arbitrage short-selling causes almost half of the negative announcement
return for acquirers in stock mergers. It is probable that the opposite happens upon merger ter-
mination. Finally, some theories based on managersempire-building proclivities (Jensen (1986))
or their propensity towards hubris (Roll (1986)) predict that merger failure should be benecial to
the acquiring rms shareholders (however, those theories do not explain why the reaction should
be di¤erent for cash and stocks bids). Whatever the explanation for the price jump when the deal
is terminated, it is hard to reconcile this nding with any theory claiming failure decreases the
bidders fundamental value.
A switch to the calendar-time approach does not inuence our results. Table X shows that
the portfolio containing stock bidders in the Exogenous Failed Sample exhibits a mean annualized
abnormal return of -20.8% (t-statistic=-3.13), -14.4% (t-statistic=-3.05), and -12.0% (t-statistic=-
2.79) for one-, two-, and three-year holding periods, respectively (starting one month after the
announcement that the bid was terminated). And while stock acquirers that do not consummate
their deals continue su¤ering poor performance even after they fail, unsuccessful cash acquirers do
not. These ndings are robust to di¤erent criteria for including failed acquirers in the analysis, to
our choice of asset pricing model, and to the method we use for calculating and weighting portfolio
returns.
[TABLE X ABOUT HERE]
D. Acquirer Valuation and Post-event Performance
Previous studies establish that valuation of acquiring rms impacts their post-announcement
returns, with value acquirers performing substantially better than glamor acquirers (Rau and Ver-
maelen (1998)). This evidence is consistent with the market-timing hypothesis: richly valued stocks
do worse than those that are more conservatively priced (assuming valuation ratios are correlated
with mispricing). We expect to obtain the same result in our sample, but only for stock acquirers.
The disparity between value and glamor stock bidders should be especially large for failed deals,
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where the acquiring rm did not succeed in issuing new stock and thus did not manage to dilute
the impact of a potential future revaluation of its assets by the market.
[TABLES XI AND XII ABOUT HERE]
We compare the performance of value and glamor acquirers in Tables XI and XII. We use a
very rudimentary classication scheme to distinguish between the two groups: for a given mode of
payment all acquirers with a book-to-market ratio above the sample median are dened as value
acquirers and the rest are glamor. Given the relatively high valuations of stock acquirers, this
approach might mean that some of the rms we classify as value acquirers are actually reasonably
highly priced. But, since the main goal of our analysis here is to explore the relation between
valuation and post-event returns, we do not believe this presents a problem. Glamor acquirers are
still all more richly valued than value acquirers.15
As predicted, stock acquirers with highly priced equity substantially underperform those with
lower valuations. For successful stock acquirers, the di¤erence between value and glamor bidders
grows from 5.3% (t-statistic=1.90) over a one-year horizon to 9.9% over a three-year horizon (t-
statistic=1.46). For stock acquirers in the All Failed Sample, the corresponding performance di¤er-
entials are 15.4% (t-statistic=2.18) and 25.2% (t-statistic=2.30). The disparity between value and
glamor is also present in the Exogenous Failed and Restricted Exogenous Failed Samples. However,
these di¤erences are mostly not statistically signicant, perhaps because of the small sample sizes.
In contrast to the results for stock acquirers, valuation does not impact post-announcement returns
for cash bidders. We nd that in cash deals glamor mostly outperforms value over a three-year
holding period, again conrming the crucial importance of consideration o¤ered for how acquirers
fare after the bid announcement.
E. Hypothetical Failed Acquirer Performance
Our ndings so far indicate that stock-nanced mergers create value for the acquirers long-term
shareholders. These results are based on a comparison between rms that successfully complete
their bids and those that do not. Another test of the value creation hypothesis would attempt
to directly estimate the performance of failed bidders had their deals been consummated. One
obvious way to do this is to combine the returns of the acquirer with those of its target. (We
exclude announcement returns, since those presumably include the bid premium the acquirer needs
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to pay in order to complete the transaction). If acquisitions benet shareholders, the (unrealized)
acquirer-target combination should on average perform better than the failed acquirer did by itself.
Unfortunately, in its simplest form this approach is unsuitable for our analysis. The problem
lies in the way we construct the samples containing failed bids. The classication schemes we
employ often rely on events a¤ecting target rms, which could systematically bias their realized
performance. One possible criterion for inclusion in the Exogenous Failed Sample is a subsequent
rival bid. Since those competing o¤ers are made after the initial one by the ultimately unsuccessful
bidder, they usually involve a price premium. The price paid by rival bidders reects not only
synergies they hope to enjoy from the merger, but also any mispricing a¤ecting their own stock.
Therefore, by design some targets in the Exogenous Failed Sample enjoy positive abnormal returns,
which would naturally inuence our ndings. Furthermore, many deals fail because the target
experiences problems, resulting in negative returns. This might balance out the previous positive
bias, but it is hard, perhaps impossible, to determine the net e¤ect.
Since using the targets own returns is problematic, we need a proxy for its performance had the
merger bid and other following developments not taken place. We use the same portfolio of 10 rms
matched on industry, size, and book-to-market that we use to compute buy-and-hold abnormal
returns. Instead of the targets own returns, we combine the acquirer returns with those of this
portfolio. Our measure of hypothetical acquirer performance (BHHyp) is the market capitalization-
weighted average of the failed acquirer and proxy target portfolio return:
BHHypm;n =
MEA
MEA +MET
BHAm;n +
MET
MEA +MET
BH
T_proxy
m;n , (3)
where BHAm;n is the acquirers realized buy-and-hold return over a period starting m trading days
after the announcement of the bid and ending n trading days after the announcement of the bid,
BH
T_proxy
m;n is the corresponding return for the targets proxy portfolio, MEA is the acquirers
market equity value (calculated using its post-announcement stock price), and MET is the targets
market equity value (calculated using its post-announcement stock price).
Importantly, this measure does not reect any synergies from combining the operations of the
two rms, since those were not realized. Assuming they are positive on average, combining re-
turns underestimates failed acquirershypothetical performance and so represents a conservative
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estimate.16 Moreover, it also focuses the analysis on how much value the acquirer extracts by ex-
changing its overvalued stock for hard assets. Given the market-timing theorys emphasis on equity
as a currency, overlooking synergies is therefore not necessarily a negative feature of our combining-
returns approach. While our previous approach implicitly assumed synergies are similar for cash
and stock deals, here there is no need for such an assumption.
As a trade-o¤, we have to rely on a proxy for the targets performance. This proxy-based
approach might be problematic, since the same endogeneity argument that applies to an acquirers
decision to make a bid also applies to target selection. And it is not immediately obvious which
way this e¤ect should go. Acquirers might prefer undervalued targets, but targets could be more
willing to accept a takeover o¤er if their own stock is highly valued.
Table XIII shows the di¤erence between hypothetical and realized post-announcement returns for
unsuccessful acquirers. (A positive number indicates that, even after the announcement of the bid,
the acquirers stock was more overvalued than that of the target.) In the Exogenous Failed Sample,
failing to close the deal costs stock acquirers 2.6% (t-statistic=1.27), 6.2% (t-statistic=2.20), and
11.8% (t-statistic=3.59) over one-, two-, and three-year holding periods, respectively. Hypothetical
returns of failed stock bidders are also higher than their realized returns in the Restricted Exogenous
Failed Sample and the All Failed Sample, suggesting that this is a robust nding. The result di¤ers
for failed cash acquirers. For them, failure does not entail any adverse consequences (hypothetical
returns of failed cash bidders are mostly lower than their realized returns). In accordance with
the market-timing theorys predictions, the motivations of stock and cash bidders appear di¤erent.
Whereas cash acquirers rely solely on synergies or target undervaluation to create value for their
shareholders, stock acquirers enjoy an additional benet of using overpriced equity as acquisition
currency.
The ndings here hold for both diversifying deals and deals between rms in the same indus-
try, where industry is dened by a rms two-digit SIC code (results available on request). This
alleviates concerns that these results are driven purely by industry e¤ects, where failed bidders
that underperformed their industry would naturally have done better had they acquired rms that
matched the industrys performance.
[TABLE XIII ABOUT HERE]
Considering our previous results, the point estimates for the di¤erence between hypothetical
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and realized acquirer performance are in the right ballpark. In the Exogenous Failed Sample, the
mean ratio of target to acquirer size is 0.512, and the mean acquirer three-year abnormal return
is -44.2%. Assuming the targets stock is correctly priced and there are no synergies, equation (3)
gives the hypothetical acquirer return:
1
0:512 + 1
  44:2% + 0:512
0:512 + 1
 0:0% =  29:2%.
The typical acquirers performance once its stock price falls back to its fundamental value would be
15.0% higher had it completed the deal. This is fairly close to the 11.8% estimate we get, validating
our proxy-based approach.
III. Related Literature
This paper is a part of a fast-growing empirical literature exploring possible links between rm
overvaluation and merger activity. Most of these papers rely on indirect estimates of the true
fundamental value of a rm. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) use accounting infor-
mation and analyst forecasts to calculate such a proxy, and nd that richly valued bidders are much
more likely to use stock to nance acquisitions, pay higher premia, and have lower announcement
returns.17 Ang and Cheng (2006) use similar inputs and report that, once overvaluation is taken
into account, stock acquirers do not underperform comparable non-acquiring rms. Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) employ a regression-based approach utilizing accounting infor-
mation as inputs and document that low long-run value to book rms buy high long-run value to
book rms. While acquirers are more highly valued than targets when looking at their market-to-
book ratios, it appears that this di¤erence stems from deviations between market and fundamental
asset values, exactly as the market-timing theory would predict. Friedman (2004) uses accounting
information and pre-event abnormal returns, and shows that acquirer overvaluation predicts bid
premia, but only in stock deals. Akbulut (2005) uses managerial insider trading, and nds that
overvalued rms are more likely to engage in stock mergers and have high pre-announcement and
low post-announcement long-term abnormal returns. Song (2007) also relies on insider trading pat-
terns as a proxy for misvaluation, showing that acquirers whose managers sell experience negative
nancial and operating performance. While the combined weight of this evidence o¤ers support
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for the market-timing theory, all the employed proxies are potentially problematic and denitely
imperfect. In contrast, we use only post-event long-term abnormal returns, which, under the as-
sumption that any mispricing eventually dissipates over time, represent a more accurate estimate
of initial overvaluation.
The reliance on long-term returns also enables us to calculate with more condence the value-
creation impact of a bid for shareholders. Many papers in the literature employ announcement
returns as such a measure. This approach has the advantage of avoiding the many pitfalls associated
with long-term abnormal returns computation, but it might not produce the best estimate in a world
where stocks can be mispriced. If the market incorrectly values a rm, it is implausible to assume
that announcement returns are not contaminated by bidder mispricing. For instance, perhaps the
market reacts negatively to a bid announcement by an overvalued rm because shareholders think
the acquirer, about whose prospects they are overoptimistic, is overpaying for the target, whose
future they assess more realistically. Or perhaps the deal prompts a partial reassessment of the
acquirers valuation, which would have occurred anyway at some point in the future.18
The ndings in this paper t within a wide literature documenting how (and whether) market-
timing a¤ects corporate decision-making. A number of papers nd that rms issuing equity earn
low subsequent returns, both for initial public o¤erings (Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995),
Ritter and Welch (2002)) and seasoned equity o¤erings (Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and
A­ eck-Graves (1995)), while the reverse is true for stock repurchases (Ikenberry, Josef Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen (1995). However, others (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007)) do not document neg-
ative performance in the post-issuance period, and argue in favor of a risk-based explanation for
the relatively low returns by equity issuers. Prior to issuance, rms seem to engage in earnings
management, which tends to successfully inate market expectations (Rangan (1998), Teoh, Welch,
and Wong (1998a), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998)). Initial pub-
lic o¤erings (IPOs) cluster in periods when analysts are optimistic about the prospects of recent
IPOs (Rajan and Servaes (1997)) and are more likely in high market-to-book industries (Pagano,
Panetta, and Zingales (1998)). High aggregate equity issues predict low market returns (Baker and
Wurgler (2000)), and the maturity of debt issues forecasts excess bond returns (Baker, Greenwood,
and Wurgler (2003)). Acquirers enjoy better announcement returns in "hot" market conditions,
but perform worse in the long term (Rosen (2004)). Firmsmarket-timing activities have long-term
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e¤ects on their capital structure (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and might also inuence their invest-
ment levels (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)). Survey evidence conrms that managers actively
consider market conditions, including the perceived valuation of their own stock, in making capital
structure and budgeting decisions (Graham and Harvey (2001)). Managers also time their personal
trades, selling own-company stock when it is richly valued (Jenter (2005)).
IV. Conclusion
The market-timing theory of acquisitions predicts that stock-nanced mergers benet the acquir-
ing rms long-term shareholders by converting overvalued equity into (less overvalued) hard assets.
So far the literature has o¤ered little support for this prediction. In this paper, we test the value
creation hypothesis. Any conventional approach centered on long-term abnormal returns is compli-
cated by the fact that it is precisely the most overvalued rms that have the greatest incentive to
engage in stock acquisitions. This positive relation between a rms valuation and its propensity to
make stock bids means we should expect to see negative post-event returns for stock acquirers, even
if their deals actually beneted their long-term shareholders. We solve this endogeneity problem by
creating a sample of mergers that fail for exogenous reasons and using it as a natural experiment.
We nd that unsuccessful stock bidders underperform successful ones in an economically meaningful
and statistically signicant way. This underperformance increases with the length of the holding
period. Over a one-year horizon, the mean abnormal return of failed acquirers is 13.6% lower than
that of successful acquirers, and this di¤erential grows to 22.2% for a two-year horizon and 31.2%
for a three-year horizon. Moreover, unsuccessful acquirers continue performing poorly even after
merger failure is announced, by which time any information related to the bid presumably became
public. Despite the negative long-term performance associated with deal failure, the market greets
bid termination with a positive reaction, suggesting investors do not view it as a negative signal
about the acquirers prospects. Glamor stock bidders perform worse than value stock bidders, and
failure to consummate is more costly for richly priced rms, indicating that valuation does play a
role in post-announcement performance. Finally, the unrealized acquirer-target combination would
have earned higher returns than the acquirer did by itself, even without any synergies. All of these
results are robust to di¤erent methodologies and to how strictly we set the criteria for inclusion into
the unsuccessful acquirer group, and none of them hold for cash-nanced bids.
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The evidence presented is consistent with the hypothesis that stock-nanced acquirers create
value for their long-term shareholders and that one mechanism by which they do so is their use of
overvalued equity to purchase hard assets at an e¤ective discount. This opportunity to benet long-
term shareholders through market-timing should be considered when examining the motives behind
and impact of various corporate managersactions. First, it creates a strong incentive for rms to
articially boost their stock price, even though this e¤ect might be costly and purely temporary.
Some a¤ected rms might ultimately not be successful in executing an acquisition, but this does not
necessarily make the stock price manipulation irrational from an ex-ante perspective (with respect
to the interests of long-term shareholders). Second, managers might pursue deals where the joint
fundamental value of the acquirers and targets assets is reduced by combining them in a single
rm. As long as market-timing gains outweigh the costs of this ine¢ ciency, long-term shareholders
will prot from the merger. If researchers do not take into account possible initial overvaluation of
the acquirer, their analysis might mistakenly ascribe such transactions to managersempire-building
tendencies or simple incompetence.
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Footnotes
1One way to shorten the horizon of the target rms managers is to compensate them for deal success.
Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) report that targets receive lower acquisition premia when their chief
executive o¢ cers enjoy extraordinary payouts. Another option is to choose as targets rms whose shareholders
have short investment horizons. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) document that rms with short-term
shareholders are more likely to get an o¤er, but earn lower premia.
2Other studies examining post-announcement acquirer performance include Mandelker (1974), Langetieg
(1978), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Loderer and Martin (1992), and
Agrawal, Ja¤e, and Mandelker (1992).
3We manually make a small number of changes to the original version. These changes fall into one of
three categories. First, the status of some late transactions was not resolved by the time the nal version of
the database was produced, so we augment it by looking up the missing information. Second, we occasionally
nd that a deal is misclassied as completed or failed. In those instances, we manually change the bids
status. Finally, in ve cases the declared potential acquirer is not the real potential acquirer (which is usually
a similarly named, but di¤erent company), and in one case the deal is not a merger, but instead a Dutch
auction for own shares. We delete those transactions from our sample. We make no claim that our corrections
are comprehensive. In general, the database appears quite accurate.
4When an o¤er is resisted by the target, the likelihood of merger success for the rejected acquirer decreases
signicantly. Baker and Savasoglu (2002) report that acquirer attitude is "the best single predictor of merger
success," with only 38% of hostile deals succeeding compared to 82% of non-hostile ones (see also Walkling
(1985) and Schwert (2000)).
5Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) nd that bidder valuation has no e¤ect on the probability
of deal success. This result would suggest there is no need for any screening, but considering the di¢ culty
of measuring overvaluation we choose a more conservative approach. In any case, we always report ndings
obtained using all unsuccessful bids.
6Louis (2004) reports systematic evidence that stock acquirers overstate earnings prior to initiating a
transaction.
7The Securities and Exchange Commission used to require that rms under its jurisdiction le their 10-K
reports within 90 days of scal year-end. This rule changed recently (deadlines were shortened for most
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rms), but was in e¤ect during the entire period we study except for December 2003. We add an extra
month to account for late lers.
8Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001), Ang and Cheng (2006), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh
(2006), and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) are recent papers reporting the same nding.
9Potential reasons include compensation for the immediate capital gains tax burden incurred by target
shareholders, greater desirability of cash as a means of payment, or the lower mean transaction size (measured
as the ratio of the targets market capitalization to that of the acquirer).
10Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) obtain the same result that successful acquirers on
average have a lower book-to-market ratio than failed ones. Ang and Cheng (2006) also nd that bidders are
more overvalued in completed stock acquisitions than in withdrawn ones.
11Sometimes the recorded announcement date does not correspond to when the market learned of the
transaction, either because there was signicant information leakage or because of delayed press report-
ing. To ensure our performance measures reect this, our event windows start one day before the o¢ cial
announcement date. This is standard in the literature.
12Given that successful and failed samples contain di¤erent numbers of observations and consequently
have unequal variances, we use the Satterthwaite (1946) approximation to compute the t-statistic. Our
results do not change with alternative treatments.
13Asquith (1983) nds that in unsuccessful merger bids announcement gains enjoyed by targets are com-
pletely reversed within a year after termination of the o¤er. This result suggests that target undervaluation
is not an important factor in driving acquisitions. Agrawal and Ja¤e (2003) analyze target operating and
stock returns and document no evidence of underperformance prior to a bid.
14Abnormal returns are annualized by multiplying by 12 intercepts obtained from monthly regressions.
15When we apply more complex schemes, such as using Fama-French book-to-market break points, we
nd that most stock acquirers fall into the glamor category, leaving us with few value bidders. Therefore, we
use the simple method described above. Our results stay the same with alternative approaches.
16Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001), and Bhagat, Dong, Hirsh-
leifer, and Noah (2005) report positive combined bidder-target announcement returns, which suggests that
mergers on average create positive synergies. The associated gains appear to accrue primarily to the targets
shareholders, so it is possible that realized synergies are not positive from the perspective of the acquirers
shareholders.
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17For the pre-1990s period, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) obtain the opposite
result that highly valued bidders enjoy better announcement returns.
18Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah (2005) is a recent paper discussing the signalling aspect of a
stock-nanced bid. See also Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Roll (1986), and
Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990).
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Figure 1. Merger bids by method of payment. The upper bar plots the number of stock-
nanced merger bids over time. The lower bar plots the number of cash-nanced merger bids over
time.
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Table I
Sample Construction
Panel A: Construction of the Exogenous Failed Sample
355 All Failed Sample
-93 Targets refusal of the o¤er
-48 Inability to conclude negotiations/not enough information
-26 Fall in acquirers stock price/problems in acquirers
operations
-2 Increase in acquirers stock price
-10 Disagreement over price/target unreceptive
-9 Changing macroeconomic conditions
-7 Bad market reception/acquirer shareholder scepticism
-6 Acquisition of the bidder
-4 Management conict over top positions/board composition
-2 Acquirers inability to obtain nancing/
nancing too expensive
148 Exogenous Failed Sample
Panel B: Construction of the Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample
148 Exogenous Failed Sample
-12 Fall in targets stock price/worsening conditions in
targets operations/rating agency downgrade of target
-11 Negative earnings (revenue) surprise at target
-10 Due diligence revelations about target
-4 Restatement of targets results
-1 Increase in targets valuation
-1 Developments in targets industry
109 Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample
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Table II
Time-series Distribution of Successful and Failed Merger Bids
This table shows the time-series distribution of merger bids we study in the paper. The Successful Sample
contains all bids that resulted in an acquisition. The All Failed Sample contains all unsuccessful bids. The
Exogenous Failed Sample contains only bids that fail for exogenous reasons. The Restricted Exogenous
Failed Sample excludes bids that fail because of developments a¤ecting the target from the Exogenous Failed
Sample.
Stock-nanced Bids Cash-nanced Bids
Full Exog. Restricted Full Exog. Restricted
Year Successful Failed Failed Ex. Failed Successful Failed Failed Ex. Failed
1978 20 8 3 2 31 18 11 11
1979 7 6 1 1 36 16 2 2
1980 18 8 1 1 17 8 3 3
1981 19 7 3 3 20 7 5 5
1982 12 3 1 0 18 6 0 0
1983 17 7 2 1 19 8 2 2
1984 15 6 4 1 30 10 2 2
1985 24 3 1 1 39 9 6 6
1986 33 10 0 0 35 9 5 5
1987 30 5 1 1 25 8 4 3
1988 15 5 3 2 33 13 9 8
1989 23 6 4 1 23 15 4 3
1990 19 6 0 0 21 3 1 1
1991 30 7 2 1 12 1 1 0
1992 35 7 2 1 12 1 0 0
1993 35 6 0 0 17 1 1 1
1994 73 6 1 0 36 7 5 3
1995 83 9 6 4 41 3 3 3
1996 86 6 5 4 36 0 0 0
1997 103 9 7 6 33 3 2 2
1998 86 10 3 1 36 3 1 1
1999 107 13 7 5 57 4 2 1
2000 83 18 10 5 42 7 5 3
2001 40 7 3 1 18 2 0 0
2002 16 4 0 0 13 3 1 0
2003 21 5 2 2 23 3 1 0
Total 1050 187 72 44 723 168 76 65
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Table III
Variable Denitions
ME Firm size is calculated as the market value of its equity as of market close two trading
days before the merger is announced (given in millions).
BE Book equity is computed as in Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003).
B=M Book-to-market is calculated as the ratio of the companys book equity and its market
capitalization (as of the end of the previous month).
Ratio Relative bid size is dened as the ratio of targets market capitalization to that of the
acquirer.
Mom Momentum is calculated as the buy-and-hold return over the 12 months preceding bid
announcement.
AR m;n Abnormal returns over an ( m;+n) event window around the announcement date are
computed as the di¤erence between the buy-and-hold return for the acquirer/target
and the buy-and-hold return for a benchmark portfolio matched on size, book-to-market,
and industry.
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Table IV
Summary Statistics for Stock-nanced Bids
This table provides summary statistics for acquirers and targets involved in stock-nanced bids. The Success-
ful Sample contains all stock-nanced bids that resulted in an acquisition. The All Failed Sample contains
all unsuccessful stock-nanced bids. The Exogenous Failed Sample contains only stock-nanced bids that
fail for exogenous reasons. The Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample excludes bids that fail because of de-
velopments a¤ecting the target from the Exogenous Failed Sample. Variable denitions for rm size (ME),
book-to-market (B=M ), announcement abnormal return (AR 1;+1), and momentum (Mom) are given in
Table III.
Panel A: Successful Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 3,772.1 0.439 -0.033 0.475 1,157.3 0.527 0.129 0.282 0.440
Median 765.2 0.374 -0.029 0.274 196.5 0.447 0.101 0.198 0.257
N 1050 1050 1000 992 1050 928 926 974 1050
Panel B: All Failed Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 5,088.3 0.462 -0.044 0.331 984.1 0.653 0.090 0.109 0.485
Median 545.5 0.381 -0.034 0.184 155.7 0.551 0.058 0.035 0.333
N 187 187 182 180 187 163 161 176 187
Panel C: Exogenous Failed Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 10,907.0 0.499 -0.045 0.375 1,492.8 0.683 0.091 0.142 0.512
Median 688.4 0.389 -0.034 0.217 271.1 0.500 0.056 0.049 0.368
N 72 72 70 69 72 65 64 68 72
Panel D: Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 16,841.7 0.537 -0.035 0.421 1,867.1 0.697 0.109 0.223 0.543
Median 820.5 0.365 -0.027 0.258 355.6 0.574 0.073 0.093 0.439
N 44 44 42 44 44 41 40 42 44
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Table V
Summary Statistics for Cash-nanced Bids
This table provides summary statistics for acquirers and targets involved in cash-nanced bids. The Successful
Sample contains all cash-nanced bids that resulted in an acquisition. The All Failed Sample contains all
unsuccessful cash-nanced bids. The Exogenous Failed Sample contains only cash-nanced bids that fail for
exogenous reasons. The Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample excludes bids that fail because of developments
a¤ecting the target from the Exogenous Failed Sample. Variable denitions for rm size (ME), book-to-
market (B=M ), announcement abnormal return (AR 1;+1), and momentum (Mom) are given in Table
III.
Panel A: Successful Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 2,058.7 0.681 0.003 0.181 452.0 0.702 0.216 0.261 0.371
Median 545.5 0.578 0.003 0.125 111.3 0.633 0.167 0.188 0.177
N 722 722 688 685 722 632 616 693 722
Panel B: All Failed Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 1,537.5 0.757 -0.009 0.213 571.2 0.808 0.161 0.400 0.990
Median 415.2 0.653 -0.009 0.178 138.5 0.703 0.122 0.322 0.312
N 168 168 161 158 168 141 139 165 168
Panel C: Exogenous Failed Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 2,460.2 0.665 -0.007 0.269 761.7 0.738 0.198 0.357 0.550
Median 479.5 0.549 -0.006 0.217 145.2 0.676 0.168 0.250 0.283
N 76 76 71 72 76 66 66 76 76
Panel D: Restricted Exogenous Failed Sample
Acquirer Target
ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom ME B/M AR 1;+1 Mom Ratio
Mean 2,375.0 0.701 -0.011 0.250 851.4 0.717 0.204 0.436 0.570
Median 599.4 0.574 -0.008 0.255 151.0 0.691 0.168 0.324 0.296
N 65 65 60 61 65 55 55 65 65
41
T
ab
le
V
I
A
cq
u
ir
er
A
n
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
t
an
d
L
on
g-
te
rm
B
u
y
-a
n
d
-H
ol
d
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
an
d
lo
ng
-t
er
m
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
ac
qu
ir
in
g
r
m
s.
T
he
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
bi
ds
th
at
re
su
lt
ed
in
an
ac
qu
is
it
io
n.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ov
er
an
(-
m
,+
n
)
ev
en
t
w
in
do
w
ar
ou
nd
th
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
da
te
(A
R
 m
;+
n
)
ar
e
de
n
ed
in
T
ab
le
II
I.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
P
an
el
A
:
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
70
-0
.0
98
-0
.1
31
0.
00
3
0.
03
0
0.
03
0
0.
01
6
[-
11
.7
0]
[-
5.
01
]
[-
4.
25
]
[-
3.
88
]
[1
.4
8]
[1
.8
9]
[1
.1
7]
[0
.4
4]
P
an
el
B
:
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
44
-0
.2
02
-0
.2
64
-0
.3
38
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
37
0.
00
8
0.
05
2
[-
6.
59
]
[-
5.
64
]
[-
5.
59
]
[-
6.
07
]
[-
2.
42
]
[-
1.
13
]
[0
.1
6]
[0
.7
8]
D
i¤
.
(B
)
-
(A
)
-0
.0
11
-0
.1
32
-0
.1
66
-0
.2
07
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
68
-0
.0
22
0.
03
6
[-
1.
56
]
[-
3.
44
]
[-
3.
17
]
[-
3.
18
]
[-
2.
83
]
[-
1.
85
]
[-
0.
39
]
[0
.4
7]
P
an
el
C
:
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
45
-0
.2
06
-0
.3
19
-0
.4
42
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
27
0.
05
6
0.
09
3
[-
4.
17
]
[-
3.
60
]
[-
4.
44
]
[-
5.
08
]
[-
1.
38
]
[-
0.
53
]
[0
.7
6]
[0
.8
4]
D
i¤
.
(C
)
-
(A
)
-0
.0
13
-0
.1
36
-0
.2
22
-0
.3
12
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
57
0.
02
6
0.
07
6
[-
1.
15
]
[-
2.
31
]
[-
2.
94
]
[-
3.
34
]
[-
1.
87
]
[-
1.
08
]
[0
.3
4]
[0
.6
6]
P
an
el
D
:
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
35
-0
.1
52
-0
.3
03
-0
.4
01
-0
.0
11
0.
02
8
0.
13
1
0.
18
5
[-
4.
18
]
[-
2.
24
]
[-
3.
43
]
[-
3.
39
]
[-
2.
06
]
[0
.5
7]
[2
.1
1]
[1
.6
0]
D
i¤
.
(D
)
-
(A
)
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
82
-0
.2
05
-0
.2
70
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
02
0.
10
1
0.
16
9
[-
0.
33
]
[-
1.
19
]
[-
2.
25
]
[-
2.
19
]
[-
2.
48
]
[-
0.
04
]
[1
.5
1]
[1
.3
9]
42
T
ab
le
V
II
C
al
en
d
ar
-t
im
e
F
am
a-
F
re
n
ch
T
h
re
e-
fa
ct
or
M
o
d
el
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s
fo
r
S
to
ck
A
cq
u
ir
er
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
ca
le
nd
ar
-t
im
e
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
st
oc
k
ac
qu
ir
er
s
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
Fa
m
a-
Fr
en
ch
th
re
e-
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
.
T
he
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
th
at
re
su
lt
ed
in
an
ac
qu
is
it
io
n.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
E
ac
h
m
on
th
w
e
fo
rm
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
co
ns
is
ti
ng
of
al
l
r
m
s
th
at
in
it
ia
te
d
an
el
ig
ib
le
bi
d
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
n
ye
ar
s
(w
he
re
n
is
th
e
le
ng
th
of
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d)
.
P
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d,
bu
t
in
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
w
ei
gh
t
ve
rs
io
n
th
e
w
ei
gh
t
as
si
gn
ed
to
an
y
si
ng
le
st
oc
k
is
lim
it
ed
to
25
%
.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
in
te
rc
ep
t
w
he
n
ex
ce
ss
p
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
re
gr
es
se
d
on
th
e
th
re
e
Fa
m
a-
Fr
en
ch
fa
ct
or
s.
Fo
r
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d
p
or
tf
ol
io
s,
w
e
ru
n
b
ot
h
O
L
S
an
d
W
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
w
he
re
th
e
w
ei
gh
ts
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
st
oc
ks
in
th
e
p
or
tf
ol
io
in
a
gi
ve
n
m
on
th
.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
W
ei
gh
t
P
or
to
fo
lio
E
qu
al
ly
W
ei
gh
te
d
P
or
to
fo
lio
W
L
S
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
(1
)
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
05
[-
1.
37
]
[-
2.
87
]
[-
2.
90
]
[-
1.
33
]
[-
2.
81
]
[-
2.
86
]
[-
3.
26
]
[-
3.
80
]
[-
3.
45
]
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
(2
)
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
12
[-
5.
04
]
[-
3.
82
]
[-
4.
34
]
[-
5.
18
]
[-
3.
82
]
[-
4.
70
]
[-
5.
41
]
[-
4.
04
]
[-
4.
57
]
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
(3
)
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
28
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
12
[-
4.
47
]
[-
3.
09
]
[-
3.
29
]
[-
4.
34
]
[-
2.
85
]
[-
1.
93
]
[-
4.
18
]
[-
3.
45
]
[-
3.
44
]
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
x.
Fa
ile
d
(4
)
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
12
[-
2.
77
]
[-
3.
19
]
[-
2.
93
]
[-
2.
28
]
[-
2.
58
]
[-
1.
60
]
[-
2.
63
]
[-
3.
25
]
[-
3.
00
]
(1
)
-
(2
)
0.
02
0
0.
01
1
0.
00
9
0.
02
2
0.
01
1
0.
01
0
0.
01
9
0.
01
0
0.
00
8
[4
.5
0]
[2
.8
8]
[3
.1
8]
[4
.6
4]
[2
.9
0]
[3
.5
9]
[4
.7
6]
[3
.0
7]
[3
.5
2]
(1
)
-
(3
)
0.
01
1
0.
00
7
0.
00
7
0.
02
5
0.
01
1
0.
00
8
0.
01
7
0.
00
8
0.
00
7
[3
.1
6]
[1
.8
7]
[2
.1
2]
[3
.7
3]
[2
.0
7]
[1
.3
0]
[3
.3
0]
[2
.0
4]
[2
.0
7]
(1
)
-
(4
)
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
01
3
0.
01
0
0.
00
6
0.
01
2
0.
00
8
0.
00
7
[1
.4
6]
[1
.6
2]
[1
.5
8]
[1
.8
4]
[1
.8
2]
[1
.0
0]
[1
.9
5]
[1
.8
7]
[1
.6
5]
43
T
ab
le
V
II
I
C
al
en
d
ar
-t
im
e
F
am
a-
F
re
n
ch
T
h
re
e-
fa
ct
or
M
o
d
el
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s
fo
r
C
as
h
A
cq
u
ir
er
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
ca
le
nd
ar
-t
im
e
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
ca
sh
ac
qu
ir
er
s
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
Fa
m
a-
Fr
en
ch
th
re
e-
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
.
T
he
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
th
at
re
su
lt
ed
in
an
ac
qu
is
it
io
n.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
E
ac
h
m
on
th
w
e
fo
rm
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
co
ns
is
ti
ng
of
al
l
r
m
s
th
at
in
it
ia
te
d
an
el
ig
ib
le
bi
d
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
n
ye
ar
s
(w
he
re
n
is
th
e
le
ng
th
of
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d)
.
P
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d,
bu
t
in
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
w
ei
gh
t
ve
rs
io
n
th
e
w
ei
gh
t
as
si
gn
ed
to
an
y
si
ng
le
st
oc
k
is
lim
it
ed
to
25
%
.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
in
te
rc
ep
t
w
he
n
ex
ce
ss
p
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
re
gr
es
se
d
on
th
e
th
re
e
Fa
m
a-
Fr
en
ch
fa
ct
or
s.
Fo
r
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d
p
or
tf
ol
io
s,
w
e
ru
n
b
ot
h
O
L
S
an
d
W
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
w
he
re
th
e
w
ei
gh
ts
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
st
oc
ks
in
th
e
p
or
tf
ol
io
in
a
gi
ve
n
m
on
th
.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
W
ei
gh
t
P
or
to
fo
lio
E
qu
al
ly
W
ei
gh
te
d
P
or
to
fo
lio
W
L
S
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
(1
)
0.
00
2
0.
00
0
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
0.
00
0
-0
.0
01
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
01
[1
.1
5]
[.0
8]
[-
.6
6]
[1
.1
4]
[.0
8]
[-
.7
1]
[.1
5]
[-
.1
4]
[-
.9
6]
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
(2
)
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
0.
00
3
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
[-
.4
9]
[-
.3
8]
[.8
8]
[-
.1
6]
[-
.3
9]
[1
.1
6]
[-
.6
0]
[-
1.
12
]
[-
.8
9]
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
(3
)
0.
00
0
-0
.0
03
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
04
0.
00
2
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
02
[-
.1
6]
[-
1.
36
]
[-
.0
1]
[-
.0
4]
[-
.9
6]
[.4
1]
[-
.5
3]
[-
1.
53
]
[-
1.
01
]
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
x.
Fa
ile
d
(4
)
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
6
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
2
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
[.8
4]
[.5
8]
[.9
1]
[1
.1
6]
[1
.3
4]
[1
.4
7]
[.6
1]
[.0
6]
[.0
3]
(1
)
-
(2
)
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
-0
.0
02
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
-0
.0
03
0.
00
4
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
[1
.0
7]
[.4
6]
[-
1.
18
]
[.5
3]
[.4
5]
[-
1.
44
]
[1
.2
6]
[1
.2
8]
[.6
9]
(1
)
-
(3
)
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
-0
.0
02
0.
00
3
0.
00
5
0.
00
2
[.6
3]
[1
.3
5]
[-
.2
4]
[.2
7]
[.9
6]
[-
.5
8]
[.6
4]
[1
.5
9]
[.7
8]
(1
)
-
(4
)
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
02
0.
00
0
-0
.0
01
[-
.9
8]
[-
.7
1]
[-
1.
03
]
[-
1.
26
]
[-
1.
42
]
[-
1.
56
]
[-
.6
0]
[-
.0
9]
[-
.3
5]
44
T
ab
le
IX
A
cq
u
ir
er
A
n
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
t
an
d
L
on
g-
te
rm
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s
u
p
on
M
er
ge
r
T
er
m
in
at
io
n
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
an
d
lo
ng
-t
er
m
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
fa
ile
d
ac
qu
ir
er
s.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ov
er
an
(-
m
,+
n
)
ev
en
t
w
in
do
w
ar
ou
nd
th
e
bi
d
te
rm
in
at
io
n
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
da
te
(A
R
F  m
;n
)
ar
e
de
n
ed
in
T
ab
le
II
I.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
P
an
el
A
:
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
F  1
;+
1
A
R
F +
2
;+
2
5
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
5
0
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
7
5
0
A
R
F  1
;+
1
A
R
F +
2
;+
2
5
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
5
0
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
01
8
-0
.1
51
-0
.2
14
-0
.2
66
0.
00
7
0.
01
0
0.
06
5
0.
08
3
[2
.6
2]
[-
4.
39
]
[-
4.
62
]
[-
4.
77
]
[1
.0
1]
[0
.2
9]
[1
.2
5]
[1
.3
2]
P
an
el
B
:
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
F  1
;+
1
A
R
F +
2
;+
2
5
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
5
0
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
7
5
0
A
R
F  1
;+
1
A
R
F +
2
;+
2
5
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
5
0
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
02
0
-0
.2
11
-0
.2
88
-0
.3
72
0.
00
8
-0
.0
20
0.
08
6
0.
07
9
[2
.9
6]
[-
4.
29
]
[-
4.
15
]
[-
4.
96
]
[1
.4
0]
[-
0.
43
]
[1
.0
4]
[0
.7
7]
P
an
el
C
:
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
F  1
;+
1
A
R
F +
2
;+
2
5
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
5
0
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
7
5
0
A
R
F  1
;+
1
A
R
F +
2
;+
2
5
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
5
0
0
A
R
F +
2
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
02
1
-0
.1
91
-0
.2
89
-0
.3
06
0.
00
7
0.
03
8
0.
16
3
0.
16
9
[2
.7
2]
[-
3.
40
]
[-
3.
37
]
[-
2.
97
]
[1
.1
6]
[0
.9
4]
[2
.0
1]
[1
.5
6]
45
T
ab
le
X
C
al
en
d
ar
-t
im
e
F
am
a-
F
re
n
ch
T
h
re
e-
fa
ct
or
M
o
d
el
T
er
m
in
at
io
n
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
ca
le
nd
ar
-t
im
e
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
fa
ile
d
ac
qu
ir
er
s
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
Fa
m
a-
Fr
en
ch
th
re
e-
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
E
ac
h
m
on
th
w
e
fo
rm
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
co
ns
is
ti
ng
of
al
l
rm
s
w
it
h
an
el
ig
ib
le
bi
d
th
at
fa
ile
d
w
it
hi
n
th
e
la
st
n
ye
ar
s
(w
he
re
n
is
th
e
le
ng
th
of
th
e
ho
ld
in
g
p
er
io
d)
.
P
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d,
bu
t
in
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
w
ei
gh
t
ve
rs
io
n
th
e
w
ei
gh
t
as
si
gn
ed
to
an
y
si
ng
le
st
oc
k
is
lim
it
ed
to
25
%
.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
in
te
rc
ep
t
w
he
n
ex
ce
ss
p
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
re
gr
es
se
d
on
th
e
th
re
e
Fa
m
a-
Fr
en
ch
fa
ct
or
s.
Fo
r
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d
p
or
tf
ol
io
s,
w
e
ru
n
b
ot
h
O
L
S
an
d
W
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
w
he
re
th
e
w
ei
gh
ts
ar
e
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
st
oc
ks
in
th
e
p
or
tf
ol
io
in
a
gi
ve
n
m
on
th
.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
W
ei
gh
t
P
or
to
fo
lio
E
qu
al
ly
W
ei
gh
te
d
P
or
to
fo
lio
W
L
S
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
1-
ye
ar
2-
ye
ar
3-
ye
ar
St
oc
k
D
ea
ls
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
10
[-
2.
92
]
[-
3.
50
]
[-
3.
65
]
[-
2.
24
]
[-
2.
96
]
[-
3.
42
]
[-
2.
76
]
[-
3.
11
]
[-
3.
58
]
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
10
[-
3.
49
]
[-
2.
91
]
[-
2.
37
]
[-
3.
02
]
[-
3.
33
]
[-
1.
47
]
[-
3.
13
]
[-
3.
05
]
[-
2.
79
]
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
x.
Fa
ile
d
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
10
[-
2.
75
]
[-
3.
00
]
[-
2.
28
]
[-
1.
84
]
[-
3.
18
]
[-
1.
30
]
[-
2.
45
]
[-
3.
34
]
[-
2.
49
]
C
as
h
D
ea
ls
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
0.
00
0
-0
.0
01
0.
00
3
0.
00
2
-0
.0
01
0.
00
3
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
01
[.0
4]
[-
.3
1]
[1
.2
0]
[.4
0]
[-
.2
9]
[1
.2
0]
[-
.5
4]
[-
1.
00
]
[-
.4
3]
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
0.
00
0
-0
.0
03
0.
00
0
0.
00
4
-0
.0
03
0.
00
2
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
02
[-
.0
6]
[-
1.
07
]
[.1
5]
[.7
3]
[-
.7
0]
[.3
9]
[-
.7
7]
[-
1.
60
]
[-
.5
0]
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
x.
Fa
ile
d
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
8
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
[.7
0]
[.3
5]
[1
.0
5]
[1
.3
7]
[1
.2
0]
[1
.1
9]
[.1
8]
[-
.1
6]
[.3
5]
46
T
ab
le
X
I
S
to
ck
A
cq
u
ir
er
A
n
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
t
an
d
L
on
g-
te
rm
B
u
y
-a
n
d
-H
ol
d
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s:
V
al
u
e
v
s.
G
la
m
or
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
an
d
lo
ng
-t
er
m
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
st
oc
k
ac
qu
ir
er
s,
ba
se
d
on
w
he
th
er
th
ey
ar
e
cl
as
si
e
d
as
va
lu
e
or
gl
am
or
r
m
s.
T
he
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
th
at
re
su
lt
ed
in
an
ac
qu
is
it
io
n.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
st
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
V
al
ue
ac
qu
ir
er
s
ar
e
al
l
ac
qu
ir
er
s
in
a
sa
m
pl
e
w
ho
se
b
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
ex
ce
ed
s
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
m
ed
ia
n,
an
d
th
e
re
st
ar
e
gl
am
or
ac
qu
ir
er
s.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ov
er
an
(-
m
,+
n
)
ev
en
t
w
in
do
w
ar
ou
nd
th
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
da
te
(A
R
 m
;+
n
)
ar
e
de
n
ed
in
T
ab
le
II
I.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
P
an
el
A
:
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
43
-0
.0
70
-0
.0
82
-0
.0
41
-0
.0
96
-0
.1
25
-0
.1
80
[-
7.
77
]
[-
2.
89
]
[-
2.
89
]
[-
2.
05
]
[-
8.
92
]
[-
4.
10
]
[-
3.
20
]
[-
3.
32
]
P
an
el
B
:
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
38
-0
.1
24
-0
.1
62
-0
.2
10
-0
.0
50
-0
.2
78
-0
.3
64
-0
.4
62
[-
4.
47
]
[-
2.
88
]
[-
2.
88
]
[-
2.
97
]
[-
4.
85
]
[-
4.
96
]
[-
4.
90
]
[-
5.
51
]
P
an
el
C
:
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
30
-0
.1
60
-0
.2
51
-0
.3
88
-0
.0
61
-0
.2
55
-0
.3
92
-0
.5
00
[-
1.
97
]
[-
2.
44
]
[-
2.
98
]
[-
3.
79
]
[-
4.
05
]
[-
2.
67
]
[-
3.
32
]
[-
3.
47
]
P
an
el
D
:
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
34
-0
.0
81
-0
.2
02
-0
.2
52
-0
.0
37
-0
.2
30
-0
.4
13
-0
.5
65
[-
2.
41
]
[-
1.
37
]
[-
2.
18
]
[-
1.
96
]
[-
4.
07
]
[-
1.
82
]
[-
2.
69
]
[-
2.
80
]
47
T
ab
le
X
II
C
as
h
A
cq
u
ir
er
A
n
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
t
an
d
L
on
g-
te
rm
B
u
y
-a
n
d
-H
ol
d
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s:
V
al
u
e
v
s.
G
la
m
or
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
an
d
lo
ng
-t
er
m
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
ab
no
rm
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
ca
sh
ac
qu
ir
er
s,
ba
se
d
on
w
he
th
er
th
ey
ar
e
cl
as
si
e
d
as
va
lu
e
or
gl
am
or
r
m
s.
T
he
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
th
at
re
su
lt
ed
in
an
ac
qu
is
it
io
n.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
ca
sh
-
na
nc
ed
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.
V
al
ue
ac
qu
ir
er
s
ar
e
al
l
ac
qu
ir
er
s
in
a
sa
m
pl
e
w
ho
se
b
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
ex
ce
ed
s
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
m
ed
ia
n,
an
d
th
e
re
st
ar
e
gl
am
or
ac
qu
ir
er
s.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ov
er
an
(-
m
,+
n
)
ev
en
t
w
in
do
w
ar
ou
nd
th
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
da
te
(A
R
 m
;+
n
)
ar
e
de
n
ed
in
T
ab
le
II
I.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
P
an
el
A
:
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
00
2
0.
01
9
0.
02
3
0.
02
9
0.
00
5
0.
04
2
0.
03
6
0.
00
3
[0
.6
3]
[1
.0
1]
[0
.6
8]
[0
.5
7]
[1
.4
6]
[1
.6
1]
[0
.9
7]
[0
.0
6]
P
an
el
B
:
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
30
0.
03
3
0.
02
4
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
45
-0
.0
18
0.
08
0
[-
2.
58
]
[-
0.
70
]
[0
.4
8]
[0
.3
1]
[-
1.
06
]
[-
0.
89
]
[-
0.
25
]
[0
.7
3]
P
an
el
C
:
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
09
0.
10
5
0.
11
6
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
44
0.
00
8
0.
07
0
[-
1.
91
]
[-
0.
18
]
[1
.1
9]
[1
.0
1]
[-
0.
31
]
[-
0.
50
]
[0
.0
7]
[0
.3
7]
P
an
el
D
:
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
V
al
ue
A
cq
ui
re
rs
G
la
m
or
A
cq
ui
re
rs
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
1
A
R
 1
;+
2
5
0
A
R
 1
;+
5
0
0
A
R
 1
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
-0
.0
13
0.
02
0
0.
12
1
0.
08
1
-0
.0
10
0.
03
7
0.
14
1
0.
28
9
[-
1.
86
]
[0
.4
0]
[1
.2
6]
[0
.6
6]
[-
1.
15
]
[0
.4
2]
[1
.7
6
]
[1
.4
8]
48
T
ab
le
X
II
I
H
y
p
ot
h
et
ic
al
F
ai
le
d
A
cq
u
ir
er
L
on
g-
te
rm
R
et
u
rn
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
th
e
di
¤
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
hy
p
ot
he
ti
ca
l
an
d
re
al
iz
ed
lo
ng
-t
er
m
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
fa
ile
d
ac
qu
ir
er
s.
T
he
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
al
l
un
su
cc
es
sf
ul
bi
ds
.
T
he
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
on
ly
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
fo
r
ex
og
en
ou
s
re
as
on
s.
T
he
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
es
bi
ds
th
at
fa
il
b
ec
au
se
of
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
a¤
ec
ti
ng
th
e
ta
rg
et
fr
om
th
e
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e.

B
H
R
 m
;+
n
is
th
e
di
¤
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n-
w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
of
th
e
ac
qu
ir
er
an
d
pr
ox
y
ta
rg
et
p
or
tf
ol
io
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
re
tu
rn
an
d
th
e
ac
qu
ir
er
bu
y-
an
d-
ho
ld
re
tu
rn
.
T
he
pr
ox
y
ta
rg
et
p
or
tf
ol
io
is
an
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d
p
or
tf
ol
io
of
10
r
m
s
m
at
ch
ed
to
th
e
ta
rg
et
on
in
du
st
ry
,
si
ze
,
an
d
b
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
t.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
P
an
el
A
:
A
ll
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs

B
H
R
+
2
;+
2
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
5
0
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
7
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
2
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
5
0
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
03
6
0.
06
3
0.
09
5
0.
00
4
0.
00
7
0.
00
2
[2
.9
3
]
[3
.9
0
]
[4
.3
2
]
[0
.2
6
]
[0
.3
0
]
[0
.0
8
]
P
an
el
B
:
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs

B
H
R
+
2
;+
2
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
5
0
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
7
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
2
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
5
0
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
02
6
0.
06
2
0.
11
8
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
32
-0
.0
24
[1
.2
7
]
[2
.2
0
]
[3
.5
9
]
[-
0.
63
]
[-
1.
10
]
[-
0.
67
]
P
an
el
C
:
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
E
xo
ge
no
us
Fa
ile
d
Sa
m
pl
e
St
oc
k-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs
C
as
h-
n
an
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
rs

B
H
R
+
2
;+
2
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
5
0
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
7
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
2
5
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
5
0
0

B
H
R
+
2
;+
7
5
0
M
ea
n
0.
00
2
0.
03
4
0.
06
8
-0
.0
34
-0
.0
57
-0
.0
51
[0
.0
9
]
[1
.1
4
]
[1
.8
0
]
[-
2.
14
]
[-
1.
86
]
[-
1.
38
]
49
